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of Maryland enjoyed absolute immunity
when vetoing or approving legislation.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland
began its analysis by noting that it was
undisputed that some degree of public
official immunity applied to the governor when performing gubernatorial
duties involving the exercise of discretion. Mandel, 320 Md. at 107,576 A.2d
at 768. The question before the court
was whether such immunity was absolute or qualified. An absolute immunity
from tort liability, the court stated,
"stands even if the official acts in bad
faith, or with malice or corrupt motives,
and protects both judges and legislators,
so long as their acts are 'judicial' or legislative in nature." Id. (quoting Prosser &
Keeton, ]be Law of Torts, § 132, at 105657 (5th ed. 1984)). Governor Mandel
argued that his veto/approval function
was a legislative one, and therefore
should be protected to the same extent
as legislators.
Due to the lack of Maryland precedence regarding gubernatorial immunity specifically, the court based its
analysis on cases dealing with 42 US.C.
§1983, a statute which the court believed to be the driving force in the
development of public official immunity. Section 1983 allows suits against
public officials who have caused the
"deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws ... " 42 US.C. §1983 (1982).
The cases, as noted by the court of
appeals, took a "functional" approach to
immunity law in that '" [t ]he scope of
immunity is determined by function, not
office.'" Mandel at 120, 576A.2d at 774
(quoting Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 us.
731,785 (1982) (White,].,dissenting)).
The court of appeals found that when
applied to cases dealing with executive
immunity, the functional approach produced disparate results. In Scheuer v.
Rhodes, for example, the Supreme Court
suggested that a governor would enjoy
qualified immunity for his deployment
of National Guard units. The Court analogized such action to possible arrest
situations confronted by police officers
whose actions are subject to good faith.
Mandel at 117, 576 A.2d at 772 (citing
Scheuerv. Rhodes, 416 US. 232 (1974)).
In contrast, the Court found in Imbler
v. Pachtman, 424 US. 420 (1976) that a
state prosecutor's function of initiating

and presenting a case was covered by
absolute immunity since the discretion
involved was similar to that of a judge.
"Thus, '[a]lthough a qualified immunity
from damages liability should be the
general rule for executive officials[,] ...
there are some officials whose special
functions require a full exemption from
liabililty.'" Mandel, at 120, 576 A.2d at
774 (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438
US. 478,508 (1978)).
When applying the functional approach to the facts sub judice, the court
of appeals found that the function of the
veto, '''as a matter of historical development as well as theory[,] ... [was] a
legislative power.'" Id. at 121-22, 576
A.2d at 775 (quoting E. Mason, The Veto
Power, 100 (A Hart. ed. 1967)). As
such, the exercise of gubernatorial veto
power requires that it is absolutely
immune from tort liability. Id. The court
explained that the act of deliberating on
the constitutionality, justice, and public
expediency of legislative measures before deciding whether or not to exercise veto power was "plainly the function of a legislator." Mandel at 122, 576
A.2d at 775 ( quoting People v. Bowmen,
21 N.Y. 517, 521-22 (1860)).
In support of its conclusion, the court
next cited Hernandez v. City of
Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188 (1982), in
which the United States Court ofAppeals
for the Fifth Circuit squarely held that
there is absolute legislative immunity
under §1983, which encompassed the
executive veto function. Mandel, at 12627,576 A.2d at 777-78. In Hernandez,
the court of appeals stated that '''[t]he
mayor's veto, like the veto of the President or a state governor, is undeniably a
part of the legislative process.'" Id.
(quoting Hernandez v. City ofLafayette,
643 F.2d at 1193-94 (1982)).
The court rejected the O'Haras' argument that the governor must be exercising the state's entire legislative power
on the subject at issue in order to assert
absolute immunity. The court did not
accept such language as a condition
precedent to absolute immunity, but
rather found that it could be asserted for
lesser delegations, such as the power to
veto.
By equating the governor's veto power
to a legislative function, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland specifically noted
that it was confining its holding to the

point of intersection of executive and
legislative powers. Therefore, although
a Governor of Maryland is an elected
official, he will nonetheless enjoy absolute immunity when exercising his constitutionally mandated power in a legiSlative capacity.
Mandel represents a Significant broadening of the immunity doctrine in an
area which had never been considered
in regard to the highest executive official of the state. Specifically, a Governor
of Maryland enjoys absolute immunity
when exercising the official function of
vetoing or approving legislation, regardless of the motives that may underlie the
function. This is in accord with the absolute immunity which the other branches
of government have long enjoyed. By so
ruling, the evidentiary problems that
would arise if a governor were held
accountable for every veto decision he
made were avoided. So too was avoided
the possible separation of powers problem that may occur if the judiciary was
empowered with the ability to judge the
acts of the executive when exercising
duties which he is constitutionally
bound to perform. The court's decision
permits such judgment to remain with
the governor's constituents, where it
belongs.
- Lesley M. Brand

Taxiera fl. Malkus: AFTER-BORN
ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN HAVE
A RIGHT TO ESTABLISH
PATERNITY OF THEIR
DECEASED PUTATIVE FATHER
In Taxiera v. Malkus, 320 Md. 471,
578 A.2d 761 (1990), the Court of
Appeals of Maryland ruled that an illegitimate child born after her alleged father's
death has the right to establish the
paternity of her putative father. In so
holding, the court stated that such an
interpretation of Maryland's paternity
statutes conforms with the legislature'S
intentions of promoting the welfare and
best interests of children born out of
wedlock.
Elaine Taxiera, a Delaware resident,
filed suit in the Circuit Court for Dorchester County against Frederick Malkus, the Personal Representative of the
Estate of Levi Brown, Jr. Id. at 473, 578
A.2d at 762. She sought a declaration
under §1-208 of the Estates and Trusts
Article that Brown was the father of her
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illegitimate daughter, Leah, who was
born four months after Brown's death.
Section 1-208(b) states that a child
born out of wedlock shall be considered
to be the child of his father only if the
father:
( 1 ) Has been judicially detennined
to be the father in an action
brought under the statutes relating to paternity proceedings; or
(2) Has acknowledged himself, in
writing, to be the father; or
(3) Has openly and notoriously
recognized the child to be his
child; or .
( 4) Has subsequently married the
mother and has acknowledged
himself, orally or in writing, to be
the father.
Id. ( quoting Md. Est. & Trusts Code Ann.
§1-208(b) (1974)).
While the action was pending, Taxierafiled a "Complaint to Establish Paternity," pursuant to Maryland's paternity
statutes, asking that Brown be declared
the father of Leah, and that child support
be paid by Brown's estate. Id. at 473-74,
578 A.2d at 762 (citing Md. Fam. Law
Code Ann. §§5-1 00 1-48 ( 1984 & Supp.
1990)).
The court noted the purpose of the
paternity statute is "to promote the
general welfare and best interests of
children born out of wedlock by securing for them, as nearly as practicable, the
same rights to support, care, and education as children born in wedlock." Id.
at 474, 578 A.2d at 762 (quoting Md.
Fam. Law Code Ann. §5-1002(b)( 1)
( 1984)). The ensuing sections, which
are couched in present tense terms of a
putative father who is alive at the time
that the paternity action is in process,
deal with a complaint against the putative father of an illegitimate child. Specifically, §5-1043 states that if a father
dies after he is judicially declared to be
the child's father, or after he is ordered
to make support payments, the court
may summon the personal representative of the deceased father and order
child support to be paid from the estate.
/Id. at 475, 578 A.2d at 762 (emphasis
added). Thus, under a literal reading of
the statute, it would appear that a court
could not order child support to be paid
from the estate of a father who, like
Brown in this case, died before any of
these two events occurs.

Malkus moved to dismiss the paternity complaint on the grounds that the
statute did not apply unless there had
been a judicial detennination of parentage before the putative father died. Id. at
475, 578A.2d at 763 (emphasis added).
In the alternative, Malkus contended
that the right to child support tenninated with the death of Brown. Id. Taxiera, however, argued that Leah would
be denied the equal protection of the
law if §5-104 3 were interpreted so as to
prevent her from establishing Brown's
paternity after his death. Id.
Taxiera's declaratory judgment action
was stayed pending detennination of
thepaternityaction.ld. at 476, 578A.2d
at 763. The trial court then dismissed
Taxiera's complaint and held that the
paternity statute "becomes relevant only
after... the court has already declared
the putative father to be the father ... or
the court has ordered the father to make
child support payments." Id. at 476-77,
578A.2d at 763-64. Thus, because these
events had not occurred, the court held
that the action could not proceed under
§5-1043.Id. at 477, 578 A.2d at 764.
The court also considered Taxiera's
argument that the "Survival of Actions"
statute, §6-401(c) of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article, pennitted
the action to continue in spite of Brown's
death. Believing that the only remedy
provided by the paternity statute was an
award of child support, the court held
that it did not have the power to require
the payment of child support by a deceased father's estate. Id.
Taxiera appealed to the court of special appeals but prior to argument, the
court of appeals granted certiorari to
consider the Significant issue of public
importance presented by the c~e. Id. at
478, 578 A.2d at 764.
First, the court of appeals explained
that in §5-1 005 of the paternity statute, a
court may determine the legitimacy of a
child pursuant to § 1-208 of the Estates
and Trusts Article. If it is judicially
determined under §1-208 that Brown
was Leah's father, Leah would be considered his child and lineal descendant
under the relevant paternity statutes. I d.
at 479, 578 A.2d at 764-65. Thus, the
court focused on §5-1002, which explicitly set forth the duty of the state "to
improve the deprived social and economic status of children born out of

wedlock," to determine if Leah was legitimate.ld. at 479, 578A.2d at 765 (quotingMd. Fam. Law Code Ann. §5-1002( 1)
(1984)).
After citing various Maryland cases
holding § 1-208(b) to be a legitimation
statute, the court stated that "the trend
of the courts throughout the country is
to give liberal interpretation to legitimation statutes or legislation which seeks
to achieve that purpose (the modem
legislative policy of mitigating the impact
of illegitimacy)." Id. at 479-80, 578A.2d
at 765 (quoting Thomas v. Solis, 263
Md. 536,542, 283 A.2d 777 (1971)).
Thus, the court held that the provisions
of §1-208(b) do not exclude a posthumous illegitimate child from inheriting from the father. Id. at 480, 578
A.2d at 765. Although a course of action
under § 1-208(b) was not available to
Taxiera, plaintiffs, including after-born
illegitimate children, who fulfill the requirements of the statute could receive
its benefits_ Id. at 479 n.5, 578 A.2d at
764 n.5.
Malkus, however, contended that the
paternity statute did not expressly authorize an action against a deceased putative father's personal representative. Id.
at 480, 578 A.2d at 765. He argued that
because the statute referred to the putative father in the present tense as a
defendant, and because of the various
provisions of the statute including the
giving of notice to the defendant, there
was a legislative intent that the law only
apply to living putative fathers. Id.
(emphasis added). Therefore, Malkus
argued that §1-208(b)( 1) of the Estates
and Trusts Article was applicable only to
putative fathers who were alive at the
time the paternity complaint was filed.
Id.
The court, however, stated that
"[w]hile the language of the statute is
the primary source for detennining legislative intent, the plain meaning rule is
not absolute." Id. Rather, the language
must be construed with regard to the
statute's purpose, aim or policies. Id_
Moreover, the court recognized that the
most harmonious construction of related
statutes, such as the ones at issue, is one
which gives full effect to both statutes.
Id. at 481, 578 A.2d at 765.
Consequently, the court concluded
that the legislative scheme, encompassing a consistent reading of § 1-208 of the
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Estates and Trusts Article and the paternity statutes, was intended to provide a
mechanism to assure that children born
out of wedlock after their putative
father's death may obtain a judicial determination of their paternity for purposes of establishing inheritance and
other rights. [d. at 481,578 A.2d at 766.
Thus, the court concluded that the circuit court was empowered under the
paternity statute to declare whether
Brown was the father of Leah, despite
the fact that he had died before the
paternity action was filed and without
regard to whether an award of child
support could be made against his estate.
Id. at 482, 578 A.2d at 766. Consequently, the court reversed the circuit
court's judgment and remanded the
case with directions to conduct further
proceedings to determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether
Brown was Leah's father. Id.
Thus, the court significantly expanded
Maryland's paternity laws, as children
born out of wedlock may now obtain a
declaration of paternity even if the
alleged father's death occurred prior to
the petition. While the number of fraudulent paternity claims may increase, this
concern, as the court noted, does not
outweigh the legitimate purpose of promoting the general welfare and best
interests of illegitimate children through
their right to establish paternity.
- Steven Vinick
Jones v. Speed: EACH APPOINTME NT AT WHICH A PHYSICIAN
NEGUGENTLY FAILS TO
CORRECTLY DIAGNOSE HIS
PATIENT MAY CONSTITUTE A
SEPARATE NEGUGENT ACT
UNDER MARYLAND'S MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE STATUTE OF
UMITATIONS.
In the recent decision of jones v.
speed, 320Md. 249, 577 A.2d64 (1990),
the court of appeals ruled that Maryland's five year statute of limitations
does not prevent a patient from bringing
a medical malpractice claim against her
negligent physician in spite of the fact
that the initial misdiagnosis occurred
more .than five years before bringing
suit.
In July of 1978, Elizabeth Jones consulted Dr. William Speed about her
severe headaches. Although Mrs. Jones

expressed concern that the headaches
may have been caused by an intracranial
abnormality, the doctor did not perform
a Computerized Axial Tomography
study ( CAT scan) or other diagnostic
studies. Mrs. Jones continued to see Dr.
Speed until September 16, 1985. During
this period she made sixteen visits to the
doctor, but Dr. Speed never ordered
diagnostic studies of any kind despite
her persistent headaches. On February
13, 1986 she suffered a nocturnal seizure. A neurologist ordered a CAT scan,
noted a brain tumor and had it surgically
removed. Since then, she has been free
of headaches and related symptoms. On
July 14, 1986, the Joneses filed suit
against Dr. Speed for failure to diagnose
the tumor despite his seven years of
treatment.ld. at 254, 577 A.2d at 66.
Mr. and Mrs. Jones first filed their
claim against Dr. Speed with the Health
Claims Arbitration Panel.!d. at 252, 577
A.2d at 65. Dr. Speed moved for summary judgment claiming that even if he
had been negligent in failing to diagnose
Mrs. Jones' brain tumor, the injury occurred upon the plaintiff's first visit to
him on July 17, 1978, more than eight
years before the complaint was filed. As
such, her claim was barred by section
5-109(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code
which requires that an action be brought
within "'[fjive years of the time the
injury was committed,'" or three years
from the date which the injury was discovered. Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code
Ann. section 5-109(a)(I), (2) (1989).
Finding that the injury occurred on
July 17, 1978, the Chairman of the
Health Claims Arbitration Panel granted
the doctor's motion. jones, 320 Md. at
252,577 A.2d at 65. The Joneses filed a
notice of rejection of the Chairman's
order and filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Agreeing
that the claim was barred by the statute
of limitations, the circuit court also
granted Dr. Speed's motion for summary
judgment. On appeal, the Court ofAppeals
of Maryland granted certiorari before
the court of special appeals heard the
case.ld. at 253, 577 A.2d at 65-66.
In their complaint, the Joneses alleged
in their first count that Dr. Speed was
negligent when Mrs. Jones first visited
him and he failed to order tests which
would detect her brain tumor. The fol-

lowing counts incorporated the first by
reference but also stated that similar
acts of negligence occurred on each of
Mrs. Jones' subsequent visits. The final
count was a joint claim for loss of consortium.ld. at 252-53, 577 A.2d at 65.
According to theJoneses, each time that
the defendant examined Mrs. Jones and
failed to order tests which would have
revealed the tumor, a separate act of
negligence with its own injury occurred.
Thus, because many of the appointments
took place within five years of filing the
complaint, they constituted negligent
acts committed within the statute of
limitations.ld. at 255-56,577 A.2d at 67.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland
agreed with the Jones' reasoning and
held that §5-109(a) did not bar their
medical malpractice claim by reason of
the statute of limitations. However, the
court cautioned that on remand they
must prove that the defendant committed a separate act of negligence within
that five year time frame. Mere proof
that she continued to suffer because of
an earlier negligent act would not be
enough.ld. at 261, 577 A.2d at 70.
Dr. Speed advanced several attacks
which failed to undermine the Jones'
argument. He claimed that accepting
the plaintiffs' rationale would breath life
into the "continuous course of treatment rule." [d. at 256, 577 A.2d at 67.
That rule, the court noted, tolled the
statute of limitations by delaying the
accrual date of undiscoverable medical
malpractice until the termination of
medical treatment. The rule had been
explicitly rejected in Hill v. Fitzgerald,
304 Md. 689, 501 A.2d 27 (1985).
Under that rule, Mrs. Jones would not
have been barred from suing as to her
first appointment because the treatment
of her headaches continued to well
within five years of her bringing her suit.
However, under the court's decision,
she was only permitted to bring suit as
to any negligence committed within five
years of her complaint, making clear that
the "continuous course of treatment
rule" remained dead. jones, 320 Md. at
256-57, 577 A.2d at 67.
The court also rejected Dr. Speed's
assertion that accepting the Jones' theorywould "frustrate the legislative intent
to provide absolute protection to health
care providers for acts of negligence
occurring more than five years before
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